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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Up until now the National Minimum Wage (NMW) introduced in April 1999 appears to have 
been a policy success.  So far there has been little evidence of a negative effect on 
employment.  However, to date, the NMW has largely been operating in a period of prolonged 
economic expansion.  Since the spring of 2008 the UK economy has experienced a downturn 
of significant proportions.  In this report we examine the impact of the UK minimum wages in 
force during the 1980s and 1990s recessions when a system of Wages Councils was in 
operation. 
   
Wages Councils set (different) minimum rates of pay in a range of low-paying industries. 
However there were still a large number of low-wage industries not covered by the 
legislation.  This project analyses the impact of the two previous recessions on employment 
and wages in Wages Council sectors relative to other similar but uncovered low-wage 
industries using data from the New Earnings Survey and Workforce in Employment Survey 
form the panel. 
 
The findings are informative about the likely consequences of the NMW in the current 
recession.  We can find no significant detrimental impact on employment from the Wages 
Councils.  We do find some evidence of negative hours effects from the Wages Councils, 
although we cannot find any further detrimental impacts through the recessions of the 1980s 
or 1990s.  In addition, our individual level results are consistent with higher turnover in the 
Wages Councils sectors.  We do find some evidence of a slowdown in turnover through the 
recessions, and some evidence that hiring increased in the 1990s recession in these low wage 
sectors.    
 
None of the results here indicate that the National Minimum Wage will have any more 
detrimental impacts on employment through the recent Credit Crunch recession.  However, 
one must be mindful of the fact that recessions can be very different.  Our individual results 
suggest this.  So the recent recession that the UK has experienced may play out differently 
across different sectors than have recessions of the past. 
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Using Wage Council Data to Identify the Effect of Recessions on the 
Impact of the Minimum Wage 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in April 1999 appears to have been 
a policy success.  Research suggests that it has raised the pay of many low wage workers 
leading to a significant compression of the bottom of the pay distribution.  Furthermore, 
despite the potential for negative employment effects from such an effective minimum 
wage, there is no clear evidence that the rising NMW has caused any significant loss of 
employment.   However, one must recognise that the NMW has largely been operating in a 
period of prolonged economic expansion.  Since the spring of 2008 the UK economy has 
experienced a downturn of significant proportions.  This has resulted in significant job loss in 
some low wage sectors.  As a consequence, the impact of the NMW on labour market 
outcomes may have changed with a greater potential for employment loss. In contrast - 
previous LPC reports have suggested that the low paid are less affected by any downturns in 
the economy.  The reality is that there is little clear evidence on how the recession affects 
the impact of the NMW and the low paid. In this project we will seek to further that 
knowledge by examining the impact of the UK minimum wages in force during the 1980s and 
1990s recessions.   
From 1909 until 1993 a system of Wages Councils were in operation in the UK. A key feature 
of the Wages Council systems is that they set (different) minimum rates of pay in a range of 
low paying industries.  However, a large number of low wage industries were not covered by 
the legislation.  In this report we provide an analysis of the impact of these recessions upon 
employment and wages in these sectors relative to other similar low wage industries.   
Our key priorities are: 
 To understand whether the existence of a minimum wage results in a differential 
impact of a recession on employment and wages in low wage sectors.  
 To be informative about the likely consequences of the NMW in the current 
recession.   
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 To examine different measures of employment at the industry level – derived from 
the Workforce in Employment Survey data and the New Earnings Survey to examine 
whether the results are robust to different sources of employment data. 
 To use both industry level and individual level econometric analysis from the 
Workforce in Employment survey and NES panel respectively to examine the effect 
of minimum wages on employment. 
 
2. WAGE COUNCILS AND A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Wages Councils were established by Winston Churchill in 1909 in order to protect 
workers in the so-called sweated trades from low pay. They set minimum wage rates in a 
number of different industries. Initially, Wages Councils existed in small manufacturing 
industries.  Coverage grew to a peak of about 60 covered sectors in the early 1960s and 
included the growing service sector industries; catering, retail, etc. The details of which 
industries have Wage Councils and when they were introduced and then disbanded are 
complicated and set out in a small literature. Good accounts of the history of these Wages 
Councils are provided in Guillebaud (1958) and Bayliss (1962).   By the time all but one1 of 
them was abolished in 1993 the 26 remaining Wages Councils set minimum wages for 
approximately 2.5 million workers in low-paid sectors (mostly in hotels and catering, retail, 
clothing manufacture, and hairdressing but also in a number of very small industries such as 
Ostrich and Fancy Feather, Rope Twine and Net manufacture).  
Each Wages Council had a similar structure to the current Low Pay Commission, with an 
equal number of employer and worker representatives, plus a maximum of three 
independent members (nominated by the government of the day).  Until the 1986 Wages 
Act, the councils generally set a myriad of minimum wages differentiated by age, occupa 
tion, and region but since 1986 set only a single rate.  
Given the unusual structure of minimum rates in the UK over the period from 1909 to 1993 
there is an under-researched natural experiment on the use of the Minimum Wage. This 
experiment relates to the introduction of industry level minimum wages in particular 
‘sweated labour’ industries over the whole period from 1909 to 1993. There has been 
                                                          
1
 The Agricultural Wages Board wasn’t abolished and won’t be until 2012. 
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relatively little analysis of the effect of these Wage Councils (see Dickens et al (1999)) but no 
analysis does what has been done in this report.  Its contribution is threefold: 
 
1. To introduce the idea of matched covered industries which are in the same 2 digit 
level SIC to exploit a Differences-in-Differences analysis. 
2. To use both industry level analysis and individual level analysis of the same problem 
to identify the effects. 
3. And finally to identify if the effects of the Minimum Wage are sensitive to the timing 
of macroeconomic shocks and more specifically to the whole downturn of the 
economy in a recession. 
 
We compare the evolution of labour market outcomes, comparing sectors covered by the 
Wages Councils with uncovered sectors.  Our emphasis will be on performance through the 
recessions of the 1980s and 1990s.  At the outset we will provide a descriptive analysis of 
employment and wage change in the different sectors looking at both average and 
distributional changes.  We then investigate the differential changes econometrically using 
panel estimation techniques.  Given that we have covered and uncovered sectors this 
analysis will be akin to differences in differences estimation.   
Within the Wages Council industries the relative “bite” of the minimum wage varied.  We 
therefore investigate the scope to which the intensity of the minimum wage affected the 
evolution of labour market outcomes through the recessions.  Furthermore, the “bite” of the 
minimum wage varied for young and adult workers, and in 1986 those under 21 years of age 
became ineligible for the minimum wage.   
We supplement the sectoral level analysis with an individual level analysis of job retention.  
Using the NES panel we can examine job retention rates over the year and compare those 
workers covered by the Wages Councils with workers in similar but uncovered sectors.  Our 
econometric model tests for differential transitions through the 1980s and 1990s recessions 
using a difference in differences methodology.  As we have many years of data we can also 
test for common trends in employment transition in years where the UK was not in 
recession. 
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3.  DEFINING A RECESSION 
 
Since the theme of this report is to use the Wages Councils’ data to study the effect of 
recessions on the impact of the Minimum Wage we need to be clear exactly what we 
mean by a recession. The formal accepted definition of a recession is 2 quarters of 
consecutive negative GDP growth.  This definition is clear and unambiguous in the 
context of quarterly data but leaves us with a difficulty when we work with annual data. 
We explored three possible definitions of a recession for yearly data: 
 
i) The year contains at least 2 consecutive quarters of negative GDP 
growth. (This would give the years 1980, 1990, 1991 as recessionary 
years.) 
ii) The year contains any 2 two quarters (not necessarily consecutive) of 
negative growth. (This would give the years 1979, 1980, 1991, as 
recessionary years.) 
iii) The year has negative growth on average over all 4 quarters. (This would 
give the years 1980, 1981, 1991 as recessionary years.) 
 
We explored the use of GDP growth directly, both instead of the recessionary indicators 
defined above and in conjunction with them. 
Finally we explored the possibility that characterising a recession by any of the three above 
methods was unnecessary in the sense that it was easier to simply characterise a ‘year’ 
effect for each year that was categorised as a recession.  This involved just including a 
separate dummy variable for all the years in our data, interacted with the relevant Wages 
Council variable. 
We found that the different possible definitions of a ‘recession’ as a discrete variable was 
unimportant and did not change the nature of our conclusions – hence the results we report 
look only at the effect of a recession defined as per definition ii) above.  However we did 
estimate separate models for each outcome using this recessionary variable alone, GDP 
growth alone, and a specification with both variables included. 
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4. DATA  
 
We construct a sectoral level panel that includes both the covered Wages Council sectors 
and comparison industrial sectors that are not covered by the minimum wage.  This panel 
covered the time period from 1975 to 1993 and consequently encompassed the recessions 
of the 1980s and 1990s.  We additionally constructed an individual level panel in order to 
examine job transitions of covered and uncovered workers. 
Following on from the analysis of Dickens, Machin and Manning (1999) we utilised data from 
both the New Earnings Survey (NES)2 and the Workforce in Employment Survey to construct 
the sectoral level panel data.  With the NES micro data there are two possible ways in which 
to identify whether an individual is covered by a Wages Council.  Firstly, the questionnaire 
asks directly whether the employee is covered by a Wages Council and if so which one.  
However, this may contain a degree of measurement error as the individual who responds 
(the employer) may not always know if the employee is covered or not.  A second method is 
to use the detailed industry and occupational information in the survey along with 
information in the Wages Orders to determine who is covered by each Wages Council.  This 
latter methodology was used by Dickens et al (1999) as their preferred measure.  The NES 
contains a wealth of detailed information on wages that allowed us to construct both 
average wages and measures of the distribution of wages.  Since the NES is a 1% random 
sample of employees in employment, the cell sizes provide a measure of employment in 
each sector.  The NES also contains information on sex, age, region, detailed hours 
information plus a number of other job and employer characteristics. This will allow us to 
examine differential changes across these groups of workers.  
An alternative measure of employment in the Wages Council sectors can be obtained from 
the Workforce in Employment figures published in various issues of the Employment 
Gazette.  These provide a detailed industry level breakdown of employees in employment.  
 In constructing the Wages Council data we follow Dickens et al (1999).  We construct this 
data again from scratch using the micro NES and the Employment Gazette.  In addition, we 
construct data on comparison industries.  This is crucial to enable us to compare labour 
market performance of covered and uncovered sectors.  In order to make meaningful 
                                                          
2
 It should be noted that the NES data is data provided by employers based on Personnel and PAYE 
records. 
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comparisons we require our uncovered sectors to be similar to the covered sectors.  Given 
that Wages Councils only existed in a range of low paid industries we are able to identify low 
paid sectors that are not covered.  i.e. Retail Distribution was covered by a Wages Council, 
whereas Wholesale Distribution was not covered.   
Table 1 details the matched Wages Councils and comparison industries.  The Data Appendix 
provides more detail on the Industry codes used to construct these industries. 
The NES micro data is used to construct an individual level panel since the same 1% of 
employees are surveyed each year3.  We then use this to examine job retention rates of both 
covered and uncovered employees as we observe employment status in each year.  More 
details of the data construction and potential problems are discussed below in Section 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
3
  The NES can be used to form a panel dataset to the extent that the individuals remain in 
employment.  The sample therefore changes to reflect retirement, death, school leaving, migration 
and other forms of non-reporting. 
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Table 1:  Matched Wages Councils and Comparison Industries 
 
Wages Council Comparison Industry  
Agriculture  Forestry & Fishing  
Aerated Waters  Brewing and Malting  
Clothing  Footwear 
Hairdressing  Sports and Recreation  
Laundry  Dry Cleaning  
Licensed Non-Residential  Canteens and Messes  
Licensed Residential  Canteens and Messes  
Unlicensed Place of Refreshment  Canteens and Messes  
Retail Food  Wholesale Food  
Retail Non-Food  Wholesale Non-Food  
Toy Manufacture  Rubber Manufacture  
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5.  ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
The central idea of this paper is to use the period from 1975 – 1993 when the Wages 
Councils were in existence to compare outcomes across “covered” industries with those in 
“uncovered” industries as detailed in Table 1. 
A further analysis which will be done in subsequent research will exploit the fact that there 
are further regimes when the Wages Councils were abolished (1993–1999) and a third 
regime in which a ‘National MW’ operated from 1999 to the present. 
 
5.1  Industry Analysis. 
 
Our first approach to the analysis is to replicate the work of Dickens, Machin and Manning 
(1999) DMM, by re-examining the period of the Wages Councils.    In this context we denote 
the industry (detailed in the Appendix) by j and the time period by t.  We seek to explain the 
variations in employment by industry over time: 
 
                                            
 
Where     is employment in Wages council j in year t.  fj is an industry fixed effect.     Here 
the Kaitz index is defined as the ratio of the Minimum Rate in Wages Council j to the industry 
average wage. 
 
         
     
      
  
 
Yeart are a set of year dummies.   This estimation equation is the same as in DMM.  We 
estimate this model in levels and in first differences.  We also estimate a version of this 
model whereby we interact the Kaitz index with our recession dummy variables defined 
above. 
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5.2  Differences-in Differences Industry Analysis using control groups. 
 
Our second approach to the analysis is to consider a Differences-in-Differences analysis of 
each industry j from a comparator industry in the same sector, but which was not under the 
jurisdiction of a Wage Council.  See the Data Appendix for exact details. We seek to explain 
the variations in the differences in employment by industry compared to its control 
comparator over time: 
 
So now we estimate the model on the full set of industries in Table 1; including the Wages 
Councils and their comparison industries.  We include a Sector fixed effect that links 
together Wages Councils with their comparison industry in each row of Table 1. 
 
                                           
                                                                 
 
Now the Kaitz index is defined for all industries but then interacted with a dummy WCj which 
signifies if the industry is a covered Wages Council or not.  This requires that we define a 
Kaitz index for the uncovered sectors.  We use the prevailing minimum rate in the 
corresponding Wages Council. 
 
5.3  Relative Industry Analysis using control groups. 
 
We also estimate a model of relative employment; between Wages Councils and their 
comparison industry.  
 
                                               
                                       
 
Where Ljt and Lct are employment in Wages Council j and comparison industry c respectively.   
Now we just define the Kaitz index for the Wages Council industries. 
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6. INDUSTRY LEVEL ANALYSIS. 
 
We construct data on covered Wages Council sectors and uncovered comparison industries 
in order to compare the evolution of employment through recessions.  We use both NES 
micro data to construct an industry-year panel on employment and wages for the time 
period 1975-1993.  In addition, we also match in employment data published in the 
Employment Gazette (from the Workforce in Employment Survey).  Each Wages Council 
industry is matched up with a comparable non-covered industry (e.g. Retail Food is matched 
with the uncovered Wholesale Food). 
Before we present our employment results, Figure 1 presents the average Kaitz Index for 
each year: 1976-1993.  Here we see significant variation in the relative “bite” of the 
minimum wage over time, with some significant increases in the late 1970s that are 
probably a result of incomes policies at the time4, some of which favoured lower-paid 
employees.    From the early 1980s through to abolition in 1993 the relative value of the 
minimum wage was declining.  Let us now turn to our employment results. 
The results in Table 1 are run in levels for the Wages Council industries only. Here we see 
that the Kaitz index is insignificantly different from zero for all of the employment results.  
This suggests that the ‘bite’ of the minimum wage has no clear effect on the level of 
employment in the Wages Council industries. Table 1 also shows how the minimum wage 
had a clear negative effect on the working hours in the industry. In Table 1 the recessionary 
effect is unclear as the 1980s recession is significantly negative in the employment equation 
but insignificant for the 1990s recession.  Likewise, there is an ambiguous effect of the 
recession on working hours, as the column (6) of Table 1 indicates that the 1990s recession 
has a positive effect on working hours – whereas the 1980s recession has no effect. In 
summary the effect on hours is clearly negative but it doesn’t get worse (or better) in 
recession. 
 
Moving to our analysis of the effects of the Wages Councils in terms of the first differences 
in employment and the first differences in working hours, we present our results in Table 2. 
Here we see that the change in the log of the Kaitz index has a clear positive effect on the 
                                                          
4
 Some of these Incomes Policies gave cash lump sums to workers which may affect his ratio. 
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change in the level of employment.  Columns (5) and (6) also show clearly that the change in 
the log of the Kaitz index has no significant effect on the change in the level of working 
hours. This table also shows that we can find no differential impact through either the 
recessions of the early 1980s or 1990s.  Hence our results suggest that overall the Wages 
Councils had a positive impact on employment growth – which is support for the results 
found in Dickens, Machin and Manning, (1999).   
Tables 1 and 2 provide evidence on the relationship between minimum wages and 
employment and working hours based on one level of differencing using consecutive time 
periods.  Our next analysis exploits another level of differencing.  Specifically we have 
carefully constructed matching uncovered industries for each Wages Council in our analysis 
based on a closely related industry at the same 2 digit level of SIC coding – but which is not 
covered by a Wages Council agreement.  Full details are in the Data Appendix. 
Table 3 reports our panel analysis of the whole set of covered and uncovered Wages Council 
industries in terms of levels of employment and working hours. This table suggests that 
there is no relationship between the level of employment and the bite of the minimum 
wage.  The interaction term with Wages Council coverage is positive in all specifications but 
not statistically different from zero. Columns (5) and (6) indicate that there is a negative 
relationship between the level of working hours and the bite of the Kaitz index.  Again the 
interaction term with Wages Council is insignificant.  However, we do find a positive and 
significant interaction with the 1980s recession, which suggests hours may have increased in 
these industries. 
Table 4 reports our panel analysis of the whole set of covered and uncovered Wages Council 
industries in terms of first differences of the levels of employment and working hours. Hence 
in some sense this analysis is a Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff where the first level of differencing comes 
at the level of distinguishing between covered and uncovered industries and the second 
level of differencing comes by considering consecutive time periods. The unobserved 
heterogeneity associated with industries (and to some extent over different economic 
circumstances at different points in time) has been netted out by the differencing procedure 
and this should give us some confidence that the results reveal more about the ‘true’ 
underlying relationship between the minimum wage and its ‘bite’ and the labour market 
outcomes of employment levels and working hours. 
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The main result which is of interest in Table 4 relates to the interaction (Diff-in-Diff) 
coefficient on the product of the Kaitz and the control dummy for the covered sector.  This 
coefficient is clearly significant and positive for both definitions of employment for both 
equation specifications.  This is good evidence that the differential effect of the bite of the 
minimum wage between the covered and uncovered sectors has a clear positive 
employment effect.  This same interaction effect is not statistically significant in relation to 
working hours – although the raw impact of the Kaitz bite on working hours (un-interacted 
with the covered/uncovered dummy) is negatively significant again.   Again we find little sign 
of any differential impact in recessions, except for some evidence that the 1990s recession 
had a positive impact (Column (2)).   
In Table 5 we estimate the relative employment model.  Here we estimate everything in first 
differences.  So our dependent variable is the change in relative employment between the 
Wages Councils and their corresponding comparison industry.  Here we find no significant 
impacts from the change in the Kaitz index, or any effects from the interactions with the 
recession dummies.   
In conclusion our results suggest that overall the Wages Councils had a positive impact on 
employment growth (as in Dickens, Machin and Manning, 1999).  We can find no differential 
impact through either the recessions of the early 1980s or 1990s.  Increases in the minimum 
rates in the covered industries, had no impact on the relative employment between the 
Wages Councils and the uncovered industries.  Furthermore, we find no relative 
employment change through either of the recessions.  Our results are robust to two 
different measures of employment and these effects are consistent with earlier papers and 
also robust to two levels of difference-in-difference analysis.  We do find a negative hours 
effect in the levels specifications.  This disappears when we take first differences.  This is not 
dissimilar to the results of Stewart (2008) in looking at the impact of the National Minimum 
Wage.  However, these results should be treated with caution since they are not robust to 
the different dynamic specifications.   
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7. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we turn to the analysis of individual transitions to examine the role of the 
Wages Councils in determining employment outcomes, again with a focus on periods of 
recession.  We utilise the micro level NES panel for the period 1975 – 1993.  Our approach is 
to examine both employment retention and employment inflows.  As in the industry level 
analysis, we compare outcomes of those in Wages Council industries with those in the 
comparison industries outlined above.   
We define job retention (Retit) for those observed in employment (or in the NES panel) at 
time period t-1 as: 
       
                         
                         
  
Where Eit = 1 if an individual i is employed and zero otherwise.   We are thus measuring the 
probability of an individual who is employed at t-1 remaining in employment at period t.   
The NES is a sample of employees in employment.  If an individual leaves employment they 
will drop out of the panel.  We therefore use this as our measure in determining 
employment retention.   
Similarly, we define inflows (Infit)  on the population of those in employment at time period t 
as: 
       
                          
                          
  
Here we measure the probability that an individual who is employed in period t was not 
employed at period t-1.  One potential problem here is that individuals may disappear from 
the NES panel for a number of reasons other than employment exit.  First, if individuals exit 
to self employment they will not appear in the NES, unless they still hold an employee 
position.  Second, the NES under-samples those with low pay (below the National Insurance 
threshold) and those who are in the process of changing jobs.  The sample frame for the NES 
is drawn from Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) tax records.  All those employees with an NI number 
that ends in two particular digits are drawn from those tax records.  The ONS then sends the 
survey form to the individual’s current employer.  As such, if an individual is not earning 
above the NI threshold they will not necessarily be picked up when sample is drawn up.  
Furthermore, if an individual moves jobs in the period between the sample frame being 
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drawn from the tax records and the survey week they are likely to drop out of the survey.  
Increasingly, firms download those employees, whose NI number ends in the relevant digits, 
directly from their payroll records. This helps to solve some of the under-reporting problems 
but this method of obtaining records was much less commonplace in the period we are 
analysing. 
Our methodology treats any individual that drops out of the panel as having left 
employment.  This is likely to overstate the degree of turnover, or understate job retention.  
Given the lack of information in the NES for reasons for exit there is ultimately little we can 
do about this problem.  Our methodology compares individuals in Wages Councils with 
those in our comparison industries. Given this we will only bias our results to the extent that 
the under-reporting of flows out of the NES differs across these Wages Councils and their 
comparison industries. 
We then estimate the following model from job retention using a probit regression on a 
sample of those in employment at time t-1: 
 
                                                         
                                                                                                      
 
Where WCit-1 is a dummy variable signifying whether the individual was in a job covered by a 
Wages Council in period t-1.  We also report results using the Kaitz index.  This is then 
interacted with a dummy variable that indicates periods of recession.  We also experiment 
here with a less restrictive version that interacts the Wages Council dummy with a full set of 
year dummies.  Sectorit-1 is a set of dummy variables that indicate the industry sector of the 
individuals.  This variable matches Wages Council industries with the comparison industries 
given in Table 6.  Xit-1 is a set of control variables including; a quartic in age, regional 
dummies, occupational dummies, a quadratic in the (log) hourly wage.  Finally, we also 
include a set of year dummies; Yearit.   
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Similarly, we estimate a probit model for inflows into employment.  This captures whether 
those currently in employment were employed a year previously. 
 
                                                   
                                                                                                          
 
7.1 Individual  level descriptive analysis 
 
 
We begin by showing some descriptive statistics on job retention and inflow rates.  Figures 
2-4 present the retention rates for full time men and women and part time women 
respectively.  Take Figure 2 for full time males.  The most obvious pattern that stands out 
from this figure is that retention rates are generally lower in the Wages Council industries 
than in their comparison industries.  This may be just a feature of the type of workers or jobs 
that exist in these industries.  In the regression analysis below we will control for observable 
characteristics of the workers that may explain some of these differences in retention.  But 
in the NES individual characteristics are limited.  It may well be the case that the sort of 
workers attracted to Wages Council jobs (e.g. Food Retail which is a sector more likely to 
employ women and who are not in a union) are different in an unobservable way from their 
comparison industries (e.g. Food Wholesale which is sector more likely to employ men who 
are in a union).  The second point to note is that retention rates are increasing over time in 
both sectors.  This may well be a feature of NES data collection, whereby more workers are 
traced directly through computerised payroll systems.   
Figure 3 presents the same for full time female workers.  Again we see that retention rates 
are higher in the comparison industries.  However, the gap is closer than for males and there 
is some evidence that the gap in retention rates closes in the recessions of the 1980s and 
1990s.   Figure 4 presents retention rates among part time women (we do not report results 
for part time men as sample numbers are very low).  These figures are more volatile for the 
comparison groups (probably due to small samples) but again we see a pattern of retention 
rates rising faster in the Wages Councils during the recessions.  There appears to be some 
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evidence here that these low wage, largely service, sectors are afforded some protection 
through recessionary periods.   
Let us now turn to the figures for inflows.  Note here that inflows are not defined in the 
standard way; in terms of number of new hires as a proportion of those out of work.  They 
are defined in terms of the stock of current employees.  Figure 5 presents the inflow rate for 
full time male employees.  These rates appear to be high; some 30-40% of those in Wages 
Council jobs were not in employment a year previous.  Note that inflow rates are higher in 
the Wages Councils than in the comparison groups.  This fact, coupled with lower retention 
rates suggest that Wages Council jobs are higher turnover jobs than the comparison sectors, 
i.e. workers cycle in and out of these jobs to a greater degree. There is also some evidence 
that inflows are declining over time; which is consistent with the NES becoming more 
effective in tracing individuals within the sample frame.  Figures 6 and 7 present inflow rates 
for full and part time women.  Inflow rates are even higher among women, particularly part 
time women. There does appear to be a decline over time but otherwise there are not any 
clearly obvious patterns through the recession.  In addition there doesn’t seem to be much 
difference between the sectors for women, especially part-time women.     
Overall the results here are indicative of a Wages Council sector with higher turnover rates; 
reflected in lower job retention and higher inflows.  However, we need to control for the 
observable characteristics that we have.  For example, age differences may explain some of 
the turnover differences between sectors.  Let us now turn to the estimation of the 
retention and inflow equations presented above.   
 
7.2 Individual level parametric results 
 
Table 6 presents the job retention results for all males and females.  The first two columns 
present results based on a Wages Council dummy for the minimum wage variable.  Columns 
3 and 4 present results using the Kaitz index, which is set to zero for the comparison sectors.  
Each regression includes a set of controls as detailed in the table.  The results confirm the 
patterns seen in the figures above.  Retention rates are indeed lower, conditional on 
observable characteristics.  For males, the coefficient on the Wages Council dummy is -0.017 
and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  This suggests that on average retention rates 
among males in Wages Council jobs are 1.7% points lower than their counterparts in the 
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comparison industries.  Also, reported are the interaction terms for the 1980s and 1990s 
recessions.  Here we find that during the 1980s recession, retention rates increased in the 
Wages Council sectors, compared to the comparison sectors, to the extent that retention 
rates became larger in the Wages Councils.  We find no such effect for the 1990s recession. 
The results for all females in column 2 are similar in spirit to these.  Retention rates are 2.6% 
points lower among women in the Wages Councils.  However, during the early 1980s 
recession retention rates increased rapidly so they became 1.6% points higher in the Wages 
Council sector for this period.  The results using the Kaitz in columns 3 and 4 index confirm 
this pattern.   
Table 7 presents results for full time workers and Table 8 for part time workers.  The results 
for full time males are almost identical to those in Table 6.  Job retention is lower except 
during the 1980s recession.    For full time female workers, we find no significant difference 
in retention rates but there is some evidence that retention increases in the 1980s 
recession.  The results for part time women in Table 8 are interesting.  Here we find that 
retention is 5% points lower in the Wages Council industries.  Note that we are comparing 
part time women in Wages Councils with part time women in the comparison industries.  
However, we now find that retention increased in both the 1980s and 1990s recessions 
among part time workers.  The results for part time male workers are reported but small 
sample sizes mean that none of the key variables of interest are statistically significant. 
 The retention results are suggestive of a Wages Council sector that has high turnover rates 
but these tend to slow down through recessionary periods.  Let us now turn to the results on 
inflows. 
Table 9 presents the inflow results for all males and females.  Here we find that inflow rates 
are higher in the Wages Council sectors, which is consistent with the story that job turnover 
is higher in these sectors, even once we control for observable characteristics.  However, a 
different pattern emerges through the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s.  Inflow rates 
decline in the 1980s recession for both males and females.  This is indicative of a slowdown 
in hiring rates during that recession, as retention rates increased, leading to more stable 
employment.  In contrast, the 1990s recession was characterised by an increase in inflows 
among the Wages Councils for both males and females.  The result for females is significant 
at the 10% level.  This is possibly indicative of individuals moving into low wage work during 
the recession.  There doesn’t appear to be any evidence that the presence of a minimum 
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wage in these sectors had any detrimental effect on hiring during the recession.  However, it 
must be noted that by the early 1990s the level of minimum wages had eroded somewhat 
compared to the 1980s recession. 
Tables 10 and 11 present the inflow rates for full and part time workers.  A similar pattern 
emerges as outlined above.  Among part time women workers, inflows are significantly 
higher in the Wages Council sectors; 3% points.  But here we find no evidence of increases in 
the 1990s recession. 
 
 
7.3 Individual level propensity score estimation results 
 
In this section we re-estimate the model above but rather than using a parametric 
specification for the regression model we utilise non-parametric propensity score 
estimation.  The advantages of this are that it is less restrictive in terms of the functional 
form imposed on the variables influencing job retention and inflows.  In addition, because 
we match on “similar” individuals that have a common support our estimates are based on 
comparing outcomes among those individuals in a Wages Council industry or comparison 
industry who are similar in all other observable ways.  This is in contrast to the regression 
approach, that compares outcomes across Wages Council sectors and comparison 
industries, conditional on observable characteristics where this conditioning can only impact 
on retention in a restrictive way.  Thus propensity score matching is more flexible.  
Table 12 presents the matching results for retention for males.  Reported are the differences 
in retention among the Wages Council (Treated) and comparison (Control) industries.  We 
report results for the whole sample and for the 1980s and 1990s recessions.  Each set of 
results reports the unmatched (raw) differences and the matched differences.  We find a 
large raw difference in retention rates of 0.05 with a t-stat of 21.89.  However, once we 
compare mean retention rates across similar individuals this difference falls to 0.014 but 
remains a significant difference.  This result is similar to the regression results in Table 6.  
The results for the two recessions show a significant unmatched difference in retention 
rates.  However, when we condition on characteristics this difference disappears.  
Table 13 presents the retention results for women.  Here we find significantly lower 
retention in the Wages Councils but once we match, this difference becomes insignificant.  
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Again we find no significant differences during the recessions.   Tables 14 and 15 present the 
inflow results for men and women respectively.  As with the regression based results above 
we find higher inflow rates in the unmatched samples.  However, when we match on similar 
individuals we do not find any significant difference in inflows.  Interestingly, the results for 
women show a lower inflow rate of about 1% point once we have matched.   Again we can 
find no recessionary effects. 
The propensity score matching results are somewhat different from the results reported 
above in the parametric section.  There we found larger differences between Wages 
Councils and comparison industries, with some reversal during recessionary periods.  Here, 
our results find fewer overall differences between sectors and no differences during 
recessions.  The less restrictive matching techniques used in this section appear to allow 
observable characteristics to better explain differences in retention and inflows between the 
two groups.   
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8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
This project investigated how recessions affect the low paid and looks at the impact of 
minimum wages.  It examined the impact of the UK minimum wages in force during the 
1980s and 1990s recessions when a system of Wages Councils was in operation.  Wages 
Councils set (different) minimum rates of pay in a range of low-paying industries. However 
there were still a large number of low-wage industries not covered by the legislation.  The 
project analysed the impact of the two previous recessions on employment and wages in 
Wages Council sectors relative to other similar but uncovered low-wage industries. 
We investigate the differential changes econometrically using panel estimation techniques.  
As sectors will have been covered and uncovered, the analysis will be akin to differences-in-
differences estimation.  Data from the New Earnings Survey and Workforce in Employment 
Survey form the panel. 
The findings are informative about the likely consequences of the NMW in the current 
recession.  We can find no significant detrimental impact on employment from the Wages 
Councils.  The industry level analysis is suggestive of positive employment effects, as 
reported in Dickens et al (1999).  We do find some evidence of a negative hours effects from 
the Wages Council, although we cannot find any further detrimental impacts through the 
recessions of the 1980s or 1990s.   
In addition, the individual level results reported here are consistent with higher turnover in 
the Wages Councils sectors.  This itself is not evidence of any detrimental employment 
effects from the minimum wage; individuals in these sectors are more likely to move in and 
out of employment.  We do find some evidence of a slowdown in turnover through the 
recessions, and some evidence that hiring increased in the 1990s recession in these low 
wage sectors.    
None of the results here indicate that the National Minimum Wage will have any more 
detrimental impacts on employment through the recent Credit Crunch recession.  However, 
one must be mindful of the fact that recessions can be very different.  Our individual results 
suggest this.  So the recent recession that the UK has experienced may play out differently 
across different sectors than have recessions of the past. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable log(Emp) log(Emp) log(Emp NES) log(Emp NES) log(hrs) log(hrs)
Log(kaitz) 0.188 0.188 -0.040 -0.033 -0.090*** -0.095***
(0.126) (0.127) (0.149) (0.150) (0.023) (0.023)
80s recession*lkaitz 0.013 -0.239* 0.010
(0.079) (0.132) (0.021)
90s recession*lkaitz -0.065 0.069 0.052*
(0.140) (0.174) (0.027)
Constant 5.687*** 5.688*** 7.052*** 7.055*** 3.826*** 3.825***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.123) (0.123) (0.019) (0.019)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs 330 330 398 398 398 398
R-Squared 0.989 0.989 0.974 0.974 0.960 0.961
Table 1: Industry Panel Wages Council Only: Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Δlog(Emp) Δlog(Emp) Δlog(Emp NES) Δlog(Emp NES) Δlog(hrs) Δlog(hrs)
ΔLog(kaitz) 0.257* 0.286** 0.266** 0.340** -0.014 -0.014
(0.136) (0.145) (0.129) (0.135) (0.021) (0.022)
80s recession*Δlkaitz -0.256 -0.793 0.045
(0.465) (0.538) (0.088)
90s recession*Δlkaitz -0.297 -0.726 -0.058
(1.036) (0.687) (0.112)
Constant 0.508*** 0.495*** -0.241* -0.274** -0.237*** -0.236***
(0.120) (0.123) (0.136) (0.137) (0.022) (0.022)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs 308 308 378 378 378 378
R-Squared 0.178 0.179 0.075 0.083 0.322 0.323
Table 2: Industry Panel Wages Council Only: First Diffs
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable log(Emp) log(Emp) log(Emp NES) log(Emp NES) log(hrs) log(hrs)
Log(kaitz) -0.009 -0.008 0.308 0.317* -0.125*** -0.130***
(0.093) (0.093) (0.190) (0.191) (0.031) (0.031)
WC coverage*Log(kaitz) 0.145 0.144 0.077 0.078 0.025 0.023
(0.119) (0.119) (0.241) (0.241) (0.039) (0.039)
80s recession*lkaitz -0.012 -0.105 0.053***
(0.052) (0.122) (0.020)
90s recession*lkaitz -0.050 0.023 0.035
(0.099) (0.172) (0.028)
Constant 5.635*** 5.636*** 7.030*** 7.032*** 3.827*** 3.825***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.130) (0.130) (0.021) (0.021)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs 648 648 796 796 796 796
R-Squared 0.991 0.991 0.945 0.945 0.920 0.921
Table 3: Industry Panel Diff in Diff: Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Δlog(Emp) Δlog(Emp) Δlog(Emp NES) Δlog(Emp NES) Δlog(hrs) Δlog(hrs)
ΔLog(kaitz) -0.242** -0.251** -0.015 -0.027 -0.072*** -0.066***
(0.097) (0.103) (0.112) (0.118) (0.021) (0.022)
WC coverage*ΔLog(kaitz) 0.766*** 0.767*** 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.035 0.035
(0.129) (0.129) (0.142) (0.143) (0.027) (0.027)
80s recession*Δlkaitz -0.142 -0.086 -0.005
(0.279) (0.349) (0.066)
90s recession*Δlkaitz 1.026* 0.390 -0.123
(0.570) (0.447) (0.084)
Constant -0.323*** -0.318*** -0.564*** -0.559*** -0.180*** -0.183***
(0.093) (0.095) (0.102) (0.103) (0.019) (0.019)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs 606 606 756 756 756 756
R-Squared 0.107 0.113 0.113 0.114 0.218 0.221
Table 4: Industry Panel: First Diffs
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Table 5: Relative Industry Panel: First Diffs 
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Δlog(Emp) Δlog(Emp) Δlog(Emp NES) Δlog(Emp NES) Δlog(hrs) Δlog(hrs) 
         
ΔLog(kaitz) 0.057 0.044 -0.080 -0.054 -0.019 -0.013 
  (0.117) (0.124) (0.148) (0.156) (0.034) (0.036) 
80s recession*Δlkaitz  0.196  -0.583  0.023 
   (0.394)  (0.619)  (0.142) 
90s recession*Δlkaitz  -0.362  0.259  -0.202 
   (0.952)  (0.790)  (0.182) 
Constant 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.021 0.017 0.018 0.017 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.050) (0.011) (0.012) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs 285 285 376 376 376 376 
R-Squared 0.148 0.149 0.112 0.115 0.078 0.081 
 
 
Table 6: Individual Retention 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Male Female Male Female 
       
Wages Councile coverage -0.017*** -0.026***    
  (0.003) (0.003)    
80s recession*WC 0.029*** 0.042***    
  (0.007) (0.008)    
90s recession*WC -0.007 0.011    
  (0.007) (0.008)    
kaitz   -0.053*** -0.059*** 
    (0.005) (0.004) 
80s recession*kaitz   0.035*** 0.050*** 
    (0.010) (0.008) 
90s recession*kaitz   -0.017 0.009 
    (0.011) (0.009) 
Constant -0.528** 1.266*** -0.509*** 1.265*** 
  (0.219) (0.398) (0.173) (0.223) 
Observations 143799 171597 153571 176543 
R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.026 
Controls include age polynomial, sector dummies, region dummies, year dummies, 
occupation dummies, log(wage) polynomial 
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Table 7: Individual Retention - Full Time Workers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Male Female Male Female 
       
Wages Councile coverage -0.017*** -0.005    
  (0.003) (0.004)    
80s recession*WC 0.029*** 0.021**    
  (0.007) (0.010)    
90s recession*WC -0.007 -0.007    
  (0.007) (0.010)    
kaitz   -0.054*** -0.045*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) 
80s recession*kaitz   0.037*** 0.033*** 
    (0.010) (0.011) 
90s recession*kaitz   -0.018 -0.016 
    (0.011) (0.012) 
Constant -0.307* 0.813*** -0.481*** 0.528* 
  (0.180) (0.285) (0.175) (0.283) 
Observations 140243 95787 149352 97608 
R-squared 0.026 0.031 0.022 0.027 
Controls include age polynomial, sector dummies, region dummies, year dummies, 
occupation dummies, log(wage) polynomial 
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Table 8: Individual Retention - Part Time Workers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Male Female Male Female 
       
Wages Councile coverage -0.026 -0.050***    
  (0.028) (0.006)    
80s recession*WC -0.061 0.058***    
  (0.058) (0.014)    
90s recession*WC -0.037 0.036***    
  (0.050) (0.012)    
Kaitz   -0.039 -0.067*** 
    (0.028) (0.006) 
80s recession*kaitz   -0.077 0.049*** 
    (0.056) (0.013) 
90s recession*kaitz   -0.035 0.036*** 
    (0.051) (0.013) 
Constant -2.329** -0.012 -1.675 -0.089 
  (1.185) (0.410) (1.050) (0.403) 
Observations 3556 75810 4219 78935 
R-squared 0.064 0.033 0.054 0.031 
Controls include age polynomial, sector dummies, region dummies, year dummies, 
occupation dummies, log(wage) polynomial 
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Table 10: Individual Inflows - Full time Workers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Male Female Male Female 
       
Wages Councile coverage 0.007** -0.012***    
  (0.003) (0.004)    
80s recession*WC -0.027*** -0.009    
  (0.007) (0.010)    
90s recession*WC 0.016** 0.023**    
  (0.007) (0.010)    
kaitz   0.045*** 0.032*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) 
80s recession*kaitz   -0.031*** -0.014 
    (0.010) (0.011) 
90s recession*kaitz   0.027** 0.039*** 
    (0.011) (0.012) 
Constant 8.939*** 16.122*** 8.805*** 16.187*** 
  (0.201) (0.410) (0.198) (0.410) 
Observations 143269 98323 152248 100153 
R-squared 0.084 0.112 0.078 0.106 
Controls include age polynomial, sector dummies, region dummies, year dummies, 
occupation dummies, log(wage) polynomial 
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Table 11: Individual Inflows - Part Time Workers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Male Female Male Female 
       
Wages Councile coverage 0.007 0.036***    
  (0.025) (0.005)    
80s recession*WC 0.076 -0.039***    
  (0.054) (0.013)    
90s recession*WC 0.064 -0.001    
  (0.046) (0.012)    
kaitz   0.046* 0.064*** 
    (0.025) (0.006) 
80s recession*kaitz   0.025 -0.047*** 
    (0.052) (0.013) 
90s recession*kaitz   0.066 -0.014 
    (0.047) (0.012) 
Constant 7.683*** 3.417*** 7.475*** 3.341*** 
  (1.027) (0.598) (0.910) (0.595) 
Observations 4086 79678 4746 82772 
R-squared 0.120 0.071 0.108 0.068 
Controls include age polynomial, sector dummies, region dummies, year dummies, 
occupation dummies, log(wage) polynomial 
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Table 12: Matching Results Retention – Males 
        
  Wages Council Comparison  Difference S.E T-stat 
All Years       
Unmatched 0.693 0.744 -0.050 0.002 -21.890 
ATT 0.693 0.708 -0.014 0.004 -3.600 
        
1980s Recession       
Unmatched 0.683 0.701 -0.018 0.006 -2.800 
ATT 0.683 0.676 0.007 0.011 0.640 
        
1990s Recession       
Unmatched 0.717 0.776 -0.059 0.007 -9.030 
ATT 0.717 0.731 -0.015 0.011 -1.280 
        
Controls as in Table 6           
 
            
Table 13: Matching Results Retention – Females 
        
  Wages Council Comparison  Difference S.E T-stat 
All Years       
Unmatched 0.663 0.686 -0.023 0.003 -9.040 
ATT 0.663 0.663 0.000 0.005 -0.080 
        
1980s Recession       
Unmatched 0.650 0.636 0.015 0.008 1.970 
ATT 0.650 0.639 0.011 0.012 0.910 
        
1990s Recession       
Unmatched 0.688 0.706 -0.018 0.007 -2.660 
ATT 0.688 0.694 -0.007 0.014 -0.460 
        
Controls as in Table 6           
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Table 14: Matching Results Inflows – Males 
        
  Wages Council Comparison  Difference S.E T-stat 
All Years       
Unmatched 0.365 0.293 0.073 0.002 30.380 
ATT 0.365 0.363 0.002 0.004 0.500 
        
1980s Recession       
Unmatched 0.350 0.321 0.029 0.006 4.490 
ATT 0.349 0.369 -0.019 0.011 -1.730 
        
1990s Recession       
Unmatched 0.320 0.238 0.083 0.007 12.280 
ATT 0.320 0.308 0.012 0.012 1.040 
        
Controls as in Table 6           
 
            
Table 15: Matching Results Inflows – Females 
        
  Wages Council Comparison  Difference S.E T-stat 
All Years       
Unmatched 0.395 0.357 0.038 0.003 14.490 
ATT 0.395 0.405 -0.010 0.005 -2.130 
        
1980s Recession       
Unmatched 0.389 0.394 -0.005 0.008 -0.690 
ATT 0.389 0.397 -0.009 0.012 -0.710 
        
1990s Recession       
Unmatched 0.365 0.325 0.041 0.007 5.700 
ATT 0.365 0.354 0.011 0.015 0.740 
        
Controls as in Table 6           
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Data Appendix: Industry codes for the Wages Councils and Comparison Industries 
Wages Council MLH (SIC68) SIC 80 Notes for WC Comparison Industry MLH (SIC68) SIC 80 
Agricultural 1 01  0-01 Agriculture excluding 
Forestry and fishing. 
1 minus 001 0 minus 01 
Aerated Waters 
Wages Council    
 
232 428 
And separately 
424-429 
Can’t get figures in late 
80s early 90s  428 
(4283) stops in 1985 
Brewing and Malting 
Food manufacture  
231 
 
426, 427 and 
separately 
411-423 
Clothing 
Manufacturing  
 
441 442 443 
444 445 446 
449 
453, 456 
 
 Footwear  450 451  
Hairdressing 
Undertakings 
889 9820 Not available in late 80s 
& 90s 
Sports and recreation 
 
882 979 
Laundry 892 9811 Not available in late 80s 
& 90s 
Dry cleaning, dying 
 
893 981 minus 
9811 or 9812 
Licensed non-
residential 
886,  887 662, 663 Pubs and nightclubs Canteens and messes 888? 664 
Licensed 
residential 
884 665  Canteens and messes 888 664 
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Wages Council MLH (SIC68) SIC 80 Notes for WC Comparison Industry MLH (SIC68) SIC 80 
Unlicensed place 
of refreshment 
885 661 SICs include all 
restaurants some of 
which will be licensed 
Canteens and 
messes 
888 664 
Retail Food 820 641 Check confectioners  617 Wholesale dist 
of food 
810 6170 
Retail Non-Food 821 642 643 645 646 647 
648 653 654 656 
Check sic68 here Other wholesale 811, 812 61 minus 6170 
Toy manufacture 494 494 Not available later (late 
80s, 90s) 
48 rubber and 
plastics 
491 48 rubber and 
plastics 
Baking abolished in 1971 
Corset, Dressmaking, Ready made garment, Rubber proofed outerwear, Shirt making, Wholesale Mantle all merged into Clothing 
manufacture in July 1981.  Hat, cap and millinery is separate but here we have to merge it with clothing because cannot get separate 
employment numbers in SIC80. 
Retail bread, flour and confectionary, Retail food, Retail newsagents and tobacco merged into Retail Food and Allied Trades in July 1979 
Retail Bookselling, Retail outfitting and drapery, Retail Furnishing merged into Retail Non-Food in July 1979 
